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BOOK REVIEW
Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry. By Kenneth Culp Davis.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969. Pp. 233. $.50.
Discretion remains the terra incognita of Anglo-American law. Though
Kenneth Culp Davis' Discretionary Justice hardly makes him the Matthew
Henson or the Francois Genet (or the Roscoe Pound for that matter)' of
this uncharted jurisprudential continent, his lucid and forceful discussion
of the cutting edge of justice could prove both catalyst and important phase
in the achievement of order in the chaos of discretion.
For most lawyers, phrases such as "gross abuse of discretion" signal noth-
ing more precise than the possibility of reversible error. In a particular
factual matrix, the words may illumine the vaguest contours of judicial
or administrative faux pas (or tyranny), but definitional or even conceptual
precision is rarely hoped or striven for. The contribution of Professor Davis
is his argument that the formulation of guides and standards for the applica-
tion of discretion is very much within the grasp of the profession. The book
assaults a comfortable citadel which meticulously applies rules in the solu-
tion of legal problems but leaves discretion-the effective limit on the
power of a public officer which "leaves him free to make a choice among
possible courses of action and inaction" 2-- pretty much to chance and
hunch.3
Suggesting both that we are a government of men as much as of laws and
that discretion begins where law ends, Davis sets out to determine how
much unnecessary discretionary power can be contracted and how necessary
discretionary power can be both confined and structured. Predictably, Davis,
as a leading theoretician of the administrative law process, emphasizes dis-
cretion exercised by administrative agencies, not that of judges and juries.
Moreover, he excludes policy-making (which overlaps discretionary justice)
and the crucial issues of politics and economic interests which in the long
run are probably more determinative of whether or not the quality of dis-
cretion is strained. It is arguable, for instance, that so long as blacks remain
relatively powerless in the American social order, discretion will nearly
I Pound, perhaps as much as any American legal scholar, was concerned with the role
of discretion in a rule-oriented system. One of his most compelling aphorisms is: "The
face of the law may be saved by an elaborate ritual, but men, and not rules, will ad-
minister justice." Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Air. L. Ray. 12, 20 (1910).
For a summation of his thought on discretion, see 2 IL POUND, JUISPRUDr2CE (1959).
2 K. DAvis, DIscmRToNARY JusncE: A PRELnMINARY INQUIRY 4 (1969) (hereinafter cited
as K. DAvIs].
3 To be sure, hunch has its roles in the application of rules. Cf. Hutcheson, The




always be used against individual blacks in quite a different way than it is
for most Americans. Policemen with discretion to arrest or not arrest fre-
quently arrest black youths in situations where identical infractions by
white youths result in, at worst, a warning.
But leaving aside the abiding issues of class and caste, Discretionary Jus-
tice treats an area of the law which has largely gone undiscussed but which
affects far more citizens than the application of rules by courts of law. "Dis-
cretionary decisions number in the billions yearly, even though the yearly
number of all civil and criminal cases commenced in all federal courts is
under one hundred thousand and the number going to trial is under twelve
thousand." 4 More importantly, writes Davis, a "startingly high proportior.
of all official discretionary action pertaining to the administration of jus.
tice is illegal or of doubtful legality. This is true in all units of American
government-federal, state, and local."5 He suggests that a way to check
official illegality is to reform discretionary justice so that it is not unnec-
essarily exercised; and so that when exercised, it is guided as much as pos-
sible by rules and standards in the way that in courts, cases are decided by
the application or by the use of rules as guides for discretionary decisions.
Davis of course concedes that the need for individualized justice makes
discretion indispensable to our (indeed any) legal system. "Every govern-
mental and legal system in world history has involved both rules and dis-
cretion. No government has ever been a government of laws and not of men
in the sense of eliminating all discretionary power. Every government has
always been a government of laws and of men."O Indeed, the need to confine
the unnecessary exercise of discretionary power or to bring it under the
optimum degree of control proceeds from the reality that discretionary
power has continued to grow apace as the legal system has adapted itself
to the demands of government in an age of technology. More important,
however, is Davis' insight that real and viable creativity is impossible in
any legal system without discretion. "Everyone recognizes the necessity for
creative action through legislation, but the most difficult creative thinking
is usually introduced through executive or administrative solutions of
specific problems .... Without discretionary power to create in the process
of deciding particular cases, the tribunal, whether judicial or administra-
tive, might never be able to develop rules. The crucial point in the process
is discretionary power to be creative in particular cases." 7
This book is, then, no exaltation of formal adjudication pursuant to
previously articulated rules. Indeed, Davis recognizes that
not many questions for discretionary justice ever reach the stage of
adjudication, whether formal or informal. Discretionary justice includes
4 K. DAvis, supra note 2, at 9.
G Id. at 12.
o Id. at 17.
7 Id. at 20-21.
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initiating, investigating, prosecuting, negotiating, settling. contracting,
dealing, advising, threatening, publicizing, concealing, planning, rec-
ommending, supervising. Often the most important discretionary deci-
sions are the negative ones, such as not to initiate, not to investigate,
not to prosecute, not to deal, and the negative decision usually means
a final disposition without even reaching the stage of either formal or
informal adjudication.... All along the line an enormous discretionary
power is the power to do nothing.8
Admitting the role and value of discretion, Davis suggests that it has as
many dangers as advantages, that "[i]n a government of men and of laws,
the portion that is a government of men, like a malignant cancer, often
tends to stifle the portion that is a government of laws. Perhaps nine-tenths
of injustice in our legal system flows from discretion and perhaps only
one-tenth from rules."9 Davis regards the present state of affairs as wholly
out of balance, that governmental and legal systems are suffused with ex-
cessive discretionary power which needs to be controlled and checked.
Davis would have agencies make constant use of their rule-making power
to clarify the vagueness inherent in statutes which delegate power. As ex-
perts in a given area, agencies are far better equipped to develop and pro-
mulgate rules than legislatures, argues Davis. Rather than invalidating
administrative action because it is taken pursuant to legislative direction
unsupported by standards, Davis would have courts require that adminis-
trators supply standards. "The requirement should gradually grow into a
requirement that administrators must strive to do as much as they reasonably
can do to develop and to make known the needed confinements of discre-
tionary power through standards, principles, and rules."1 0 And rather than
striving for rules which contain abstract generalizations applicable across
the board in varying factual contexts, he would limit rule-making to the
resolution of one or more hypotheticals. Rule-making by hypothetical would
go a long ways towards clarification of uncertain law, a major function of
the administrative process.
Another important Davis tenet is that administrative power should be
structured as well as confined. While confining discretionary power keeps
it within designated boundaries, structuring controls the manner of exer-
cise within the boundaries. Administrative rule-making confines as well as
structures discretionary power-rules which establish limits on discretionary
power confining it and rules which specify what the administrator does
within the limits structuring the administrator's power. "The seven instru-
ments that are most useful in the structuring of discretionary power are
open plans, open policy statements, open rules, open findings, open reasons,
open precedents, and fair informal procedure.... Openness is the natural
8 Id. at 22.
9 Id. at 25.
10 Id. at 59.
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enemy of arbitrariness and a natural ally in the fight against injustice.""
Before turning to the most provocative and probably ultimately the most
controversial suggestion in the book-Davis' idea that police should make
policy through rule-making procedure-notice should be taken of his em-
phasis on openness as a means of structuring discretionary power. What
makes the exercise of administrative discretion so terrifying is the impene-
trable mystery which enshrouds its exercise. Various provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,12 as well as the Information Act,13 recognize
the need for openness as a check on arbitrariness. Yet, as Davis points out,
"more than 90 percent of the American administrative process is behind
closed doors ....-"14 Hearings, of course, are generally open, but informal
proceedings and records are just as generally secret. It is in the informal
procedures that the bulk of agency work is accomplished. Davis believes
lawyers should abandon the all or nothing stress on trial-type procedure or
total informality. A middle ground is possible with procedural protections
that fall short of the elaborate rules which surround formal trials or ad-
ministrative hearings, but which apprise a party of the nature of the evi-
dence upon which the agency action is predicated and the rationale for the
agency decision.
To lawyer and layman alike, agency operation and procedure is, to say
the least, baffling. Many lawyers are at home, or nearly so, in court. Almost
all are strangers in the land of the administrative agency. Exhausting ad-
ministrative remedies often exhausts the lawyer as well as the client. Simply
finding out what the agency has done and why it did it is for most lawyers
a herculean task for which few clients can really afford to pay. Because the
rules by which agencies operate are so little known, because agency policy
is often both impalpable and arcane, the most resourceful of lawyers, not
to say clients, are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to obtaining
relief at the agency level. Openness, the kind which exists in a courtroom
(but without its ceremony and formality), would check any tendency of
administrators to act improperly, either through a lack of or because of
false information and data, and would expose, both within and without
the agency, decisions which are demonstrably irrational.
Davis' paradigm of completely unstructured discretionary power is that
wielded by the United States Parole Board. He comments:
In granting or denying parole, the board makes no attempt to structure
its discretionary powe' through rules, policy statements, or guidelines;
it does not structure through statements of findings and reasons; it has
11 ld. at 98.
12 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (Supp. IV, 1968) (providing for written statement of the
grounds for denial of requests made in connection with agency proceedings).
13 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV, 1968).
14 K. DAvis, supra note 2, at 113.
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no system of precedents; the degree of openness of proceedings and
records is about the least possible; and procedural safe-guards are
almost totally absent. Moreover, checking of discretion is minimal;
board members do not check each other by deliberating together about
decisions; administrative check of board decisions is almost non-exis-
tent; and judicial review is customarily unavailable.'8
Although the board makes fifteen thousand decisions per year granting
or denying parole, it has, says Davis, never announced rules, standards, or
guides. Moreover, it has never publicly stated any substantive principles
that guide it in determining the probability that a prisoner ill commit
another crime or stated the kinds of cases in wlich parole will be usually
granted or denied. "Because parole cases involve vital interests of individ-
uals, and because the performance of the Parole Board seems on the whole
about as low in quality as anything ... in the federal government," 0 Davis
believes that courts should reexamine the doctrine that parole is only a
privilege and that parole decisions are not reviewable for abuse of discre-
tion. Knowledge of reviewability may provide incentives for Parole Board
reform. Finally, Davis would not limit structuring to Parole Board deci-
sions but calls for structuring of the sentencing power so as to avoid the
unjustified and sometimes fantastic disparity and inequality in sentencing.
The discussion of discretion in the administration of criminal justice is
perhaps the most challenging aspect of the book. The administration of
the criminal law is the cause celebre of the American legal system, in fact
of American political life. Davis is clearly one of the most perceptive of
contemporary legal scholars; and, while his view of the criminal justice
system is not the most informed, it is certainly one of the most imaginative.
Discretionary Justice is an important work if only because it directs a
first-rate intelligence to a vital aspect of the criminal justice system-the
exercise of discretion by police.
Davis' consideration of discretion in the context of law enforcement
recalls Dean Roscoe Pound's (whom Davis once upon a time raked over
intellectual coals because of Pound's idiosyncratic view of administrative
agencies)' 7 concern with discretion and the administration of criminal jus-
tice. "On the one hand," wrote Pound, "a body of criminal law is made
up of rules prohibiting specific items of conduct. On the other hand, it is
made up of checks and limitations on the enforcement of those prohibi-
tions, and so on the activity of those who aie charged with enforcing
them."' 8 Both aspects of the criminal justice process are vital, indeed in-
15 Id. at 126.
16 Id. at 133.
17 Davis, Dean Pound and Administrative Law, 42 COLUN. L. RE%. 89 (192); Davis.
Dean Pound's Errors About Administrative Agencies, 42 COLum. L. REv. 504 (1942).
is Pound, Individualization of Justice, 7 FORDHr L. REv. 153 (1938).
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dispensable. Not only general security but also individual life are threat-
ened by the unchecked enforcement of the law. But unregulated human
conduct is equally destructive of the social order, which has the two-fold
task of maintaining the general security while protecting the quality of
individual life.
Another side of this inherent conflict is expressed in the abiding reality
that "[l]aw must be stable and yet it cannot stand still."19 The drive for
certainty and security constantly exerts pressure for an immutable basis
for the ordering of human life. But life is ever in flux, and thus, as Harry
W. Jones has suggested, "law cannot be stable, in any effective sense, if it
stands still."20 And so the proverbial pendulum swings: 21 the task of law to
provide certainty and regulate change, to ensure order without denying
freedom, continues. Without stability and certainty, the ensuing chaos
would make both progress and liberty impossible.
In the criminal justice process, the role of discretion is paramount in
the mediation of the rigors of the law's precepts. Police ignore or take
notice of offenses, prosecutors nolle prosequi or prosecute; 22 grand juries
have the power to indict; juries return general verdicts of not guilty despite
the most careful instruction and in the face of certain proof; judges have
discretion in sentencing and, indeed, may not sentence at all but grant
instead probation. Finally, there is the power of parole and pardon,23
exercised so capriciously in the federal system. Throughout the administra-
19 R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923).
20 Jones, The Creative Power and Function of Law in Historical Perspective, 17 VAND.
L. REv. 135, 139 (1963).
21 "Legal history shows a constant swinging back and forth from an extreme reliance
upon systematic administration of justice according to legal precepts, and an unsystematic
administration according to the will of magistrates or administrative officials for the time
being." Pound, supra note 18, at 155.
"Legal history shows a constant movement back and forth between wide judicial dis.
cretion on the one hand, and strict confinement of the magistrate by detailed rules upon
the other hand." Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 699 (1913).
22 In the prosecution of alleged violators of the draft laws, former U.S. Attorney
Robert M. Morgenthau of New York City was charged by the New York Civil Liberties
Union with displaying "unparalleled harshness and vindictiveness." Asserting that
prosecutors in Morgenthau's office were "apparently unable to distinguish crimes of
violence from acts of conscience," a spokesman for the Union suggested that Morgenthau
was not .dictated to by the Justice Department since "other United States Attorney's offices
around the nation do not handle these cases in the same ways." The attack on Morgen-
thau came after a divinity student received a two-year sentence after indictment and
prosecution for a range of infractions of the draft law, including failure to report for a
physical examination, failure to fill out a questionnaire, failure to possess a draft card
and failure to submit to induction. "This piling on of charges can only be likened to a
vendetta." N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1969, § 1, at 3, col. 2.
23 The process has been called "the sieve effect." A. BILUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUsTICE 50.55
(1967). For another recent study of the operation and impact of discretion, see D. OAKs
& W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 40-43 (1968).
[Vol. 4
BOOK REVIEW
tion of criminal justice, there is and -will always be this constant readjust-
merit of claims and interests, the achievement of "practical compromise
between over-minute lawmaking and over-wide discretion."24
It hardly needs saying that police departments almost uniformly fall
short of the Olympian detachment envisioned by Pound for law enforce-
ment agencies. Thus it is that in discussing discretion Davis is forced to
deal with masters of its abuse. Though he recognizes that discretionary
power is central to the police mission, Davis argues that police make policy
and should do a large portion of their policy-making through rule-making
procedure similar to that required by the Administrative Procedure Act.
Although on balance his conception of the police bureaucracy is in turn
naive and lacking in sophistication, it deserves serious consideration because
of its originality and the intellectual vigor with which it confronts a prob-
lem more experienced and knowing students of the police usually skirt.
Davis conceptualizes law enforcement agencies as just that-agencies in
which 420,000 policemen work for some 40,000 separate entities. (All seven
major federal independent regulatory agencies employ only about 10,000
persons.) These policemen spend most of their time in peacekeeping and
related service activities which involve the making of policy:
Policy has to be made about what private disputes to mediate and how
to do it, breaking up sidewalk gatherings, stopping undue noisiness
during sleeping hours, legally or illegally tapping wires and using
listening devices, helping drunks, deciding what to do with runaway
boys who refuse to go home, breaking up fights and matrimonial dis-
putes, deliberately destroying valuable property such as gambling
devices even when admissible evidence that it has been used illegally
is lacking, engaging in preventive detention in violation of the Con-
stitution, stopping citizens on the street, entering and searching prem-
ises, and deciding which crimes not to investigate for lack of manpower.
Policy has to be made for the enormous field of police control of juve-
niles. Policy has to be made on such huge and troublesome subjects as
the relations between the police and various minority groups.25
Davis argues that the public and the police must shed their reluctance
to confront the facts that the police do make policy, that the police are not
ministerial officials enforcing all laws, and that the police exercise the most
sweeping kinds of discretionary power. Indeed, not only is discretion at the
very core of the police function, much of police policy-making is "unautho-
rized by statute or ordinance" or is "directly contrary to statutes and ordi-
nances."26 Moreover, much of this illegal policy-making is beyond the
24 R. PouND, CmMINAL JUsTcE IN ANrmucA 42 (1930).
25 K. DAvis, supra note 2, at 81-82 [footnotes omitted].
26 Id. at 84.
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reach of the courts or without any legislatively imposed guidelines whatso-
ever. Finally, this policy-making is not confined to the upper echelons of
the law enforcement hierarchy, but is made by subordinates, the "cop on
the beat." The book argues that the acquiescence in the unbridled power
of the individual police officer to make policy stems from the pervasive
misconception that the police do not make policy. Davis declares:
In general, top officers refuse to acknowledge that their departments
are making important policy determinations and that they must ac-
cordingly plan a system for making such determinations. The legislative
bodies have never knowingly delegated policy-making power to the
police, and the heads of the departments have never explicitly sub-
delegated such power to their subordinates. Yet the policy-making
power has grown tremendously. And the principal place of growth is
in the lower levels of police organizations.27
How, then, would Davis halt widespread weighing of social values by
single individuals whose median education is 12.4 years, less than half a
year of college, according to the President's Crime Commission?28 Pursuing
vigorously the administrative agency model, Davis argues for guiding the
discretion of policemen with "administrative rules adopted through pro-
cedure like that prescribed by the federal Administrative Procedure Act." 8
Formulation of rules by top officers of the department and other local gov-
ernmental officials about when and where not to make arrests or enforce
laws will, in his view, curb much of the oppressive use of discretion by
individual policemen. Davis believes that if the community participates
in the development of the rules and if the police know they must obey
them (unlike the "rules" in current police manuals systematically violated
by policemen with acquiescence by their superiors), police abuse of discre-
tion and illegal use of their power can be significantly curbed.
Visionary is not the word that comes most immediately to mind when
describing the sum of Professor Davis' scholarly work. True, he has fused
the is and the ought as well as most; his landmark treatise is proof of his
mastery of present things and future hopes.0 Yet in Discretionary Justice
he has reached beyond even his own grasp and in apparent frustration and
impatience with the official anarchy that passes for law enforcement has
presupposed the existence of a political technique for change which more
now than ever before seems nonexistent. Surely there is in part an inten-
tionality to the apparent capriciousness of police exercise of discretion.
27 Id. at 89.
28 PRESIDENT'S CONM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 10 (1967).
20 K. DAvIs, supra note 2, at 219.
30 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAiW TREATISE (1958).
[V~ol. 4
BOOK REVIEW
Police behavior wlich appears irrational to the legal scholar and cruel to
the oppressed may be highly functional in a society which uses the police
in sometimes subtle, but frequently cruel ways to check social unrest and
change.
Davis may be deceived, but much of the silent majority are not. Police
discretion is as broad as the necessity to check the blacks, to curb dissent,
requires. Discretion's handmaiden is often terror, and terror masked in
blue and badge is sometimes the receipt for civil peace. Some will find
this a bleak, absurd caricature of the present state of law enforcement.
But that is a question of perspective-like the recent polls which indicate
that three of every four whites think integration is proceeding too swiftly,
three of four blacks the reverse.
Regardless, however, of how benign the view of the police, Davis' analysis
takes no account of the art of the possible-that is to say, politics and the
prevailing power relationships in American society which insulate the
police from the kinds of changes he advocates. It is no accident that recent
efforts to "professionalize" the police aim not at reducing discretion but
at making them more efficient. Efficient, it must be asked, to do what? To
the young and the black the police are all too efficient (except, it must be
added, in enforcing the law in the ghetto).
To return in dosing to the world of the conceptual, which is to say
away from Harlem and Watts (and, if Professor Davis will not think rude,
away from Chicago's Woodlawn), there is a kind of apples and oranges
unreality in comparing police departments to Washington bureaucracies.
As Wittgenstein said in another context, the similarities should be noted
but so too the differences.
HFNRY WV. McGEE, JR.
Acting Professor of Law
University of California,
Los Angeles, School of
Law
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